Realismo e Falibilismo: Um Contraponto entre Peirce e Popper

Abstract

Peirce and Popper developed their philosophies in different times, and Popper had a very superficial contact with Peirce works, insufficient so that these could influence in a decisive way his thought. In spite of, both develop quite convergent theories concerning to the fallibility of the science. The present work compares some points of these two authors' theories, trying to detach their common and divergent points, above all in what it refers to the realism, that appears as necessary to the background theory of the fallibilism. The undertaken analysis allows to conclude that the background of the realism in Peirce appears in a much more solid way than in Popper, once the first faces the subject in a wider spectrum, which allows to propose solutions for problems that, for Popper, they are still considered a mystery. The including realism of Peirce strengthens his falibillism, while the realism of Popper, can t overcome the notion of the common sense, that makes his falseacionism presents gaps and inconsistencies, that are discussed during this work. So, it is concluded that the peircean fallibilism includes the Popper falseacionism, once it discusses very similar problems and it opens ways for a wider discussion and more including solutions of the problems faced by both