Democracia, controle e corrupção: o caso da “Máfia dos Auditores Fiscais” na cidade de São Paulo: 2013

Abstract

In this study, the administrations of mayors of Gilberto Kassab and Fernando Haddad were analyzed with the intention of demonstrating the performance of democratic controls in the fight against corruption, as well as the practices in the public policy of the city of Sao Paulo during the period of their administrations. As a result, the case known as the "Audit Tax Mafia" was analyzed, which shows the State's fragility in containing, restraining, and extirpating these criminal organizations located within its core. It also emphasizes the importance of administrative actions and decisions aimed at interfering in partisan and personal political interests, or as reinforcers of practices of corruption and disorder. The study demonstrates that the institutional apparatus, which should exercise the function of control, suffers numerous negative interferences and, to a large extent, treats the cases superficially and without the rigor that a realignment of paths would require, as well as in the sphere of Justice. As a result, corruption becomes "institutionalized" and becomes a part of the current politicaladministrative system, within a promiscuous correlation between the executive and legislative branches and several other agents, among them lies a section of public officials