Grupos de interesse na formulação da política externa norte-americana: o lobby da indústria farmacêutica

Abstract

The present work aims to analyze the participation of interest groups in the definition of the American foreign policy when defending their interests. Based on the two-level model proposed by Robert Putnam, it considers the impact of domestic actors in the decision-making process of the US foreign trade policy. From this perspective, we analyze how the pharmaceutical industry lobby is organized and its strategies to assert their interests and influence the formulation of the country's foreign policy, by using its financial resources and channels of influence with governamental institutions responsible for the definition of trade policy to pressure the US government in its international negotiations for regulations that would benefit the sector. Thus, the case study of the TRIPS Agreement (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) negotiations under GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) demonstrates how the pharmaceutical lobby strategy proved to be efficient