Inconsistências no dizer: contradição e psicanálise

Abstract

Listening in psychoanalytic practice and social interactions does not cease to point out the spontaneous existence of contradictions in speech, in contrast to the justifiable tendency to overcome or eliminate contradictory expressions in spheres that respond to philosophical premises that support and are supported by the force of reason and therefore do not admit inconsistencies in communication. This dissertation seeks to discuss and theorize about the value of contradictions for Psychoanalysis through its occurrences in Freudian theory and the sense that the subject is governed by his unconscious, that is, human beings are definitely split by the unconscious. In this direction, this study comprehends an introduction followed by four chapters. In the first chapter, I place the investigations on speech inconsistencies carried out within the line of Acquisition, Pathologies and Language Clinic, as proposed and developed by Lier-DeVitto, from which I extracted an inspiring starting point to theorize the problem of contradiction. In the next chapter, I address the traditional rule of Aristotelian logic in Western thought and the inadmissibility emplacement reserved for contradictions; it is within this untouchable heritage that the novelty of the Brazilian philosopher, logician and mathematician Newton da Costa stands out when proposing a logic that accepts and accommodates contradictions. In the third chapter, I expose the disruption made by Sigmund Freud and Psychoanalysis on the discourse of reason when inaugurating a human functioning caused by the unconscious and therefore accepts contradictions. The final chapter presents the significant occurrence of the theme of contradiction in Freud's theoretical construct and the implications of this issue for his characterization of the subject and his psychic functioning