A crítica ao nominalismo na filosofia de Charles Sanders Peirce

Abstract

Master's dissertation with the objective of exposing Peirce's criticism to nominalism. The first chapter takes as a starting point of the controversy between Duns Scotus and Guilherme Ockham, as well as an analysis by Peirce of such dispute, proceeding with the implications of nominalism to the history of philosophy. The second chapter deals with Peirce's phenomenology and scientific metaphysics, highlighting the difference between the categories of firstness, secondness and thirdness and nominalist’s view that deny universals. The third chapter deals with the evolutionary, synechist and ty-chist views of Peirce, highlighting Peirce's rejection of the denial of of continuity in favor of an evolutionary cosmology, considering how Peirce sees an oposition between this view and nominalism. In the fourth chapter, we discuss an opposition between modern science and nominalism, with the implications to semiotics, logic and scientific method that this entails. We conclude by affirming the centrality of Peirce's critique of nominal-ism within his work