A filosofia de Peirce enquanto fundamento da ética do discurso

Abstract

Habermas, with the publication of essays Truth and Justification, revises his formal pragmatics related to philosophical questions of truth, justification, correctness and moral legitimacy. He adopts the fallibilism for his concept of truth in accordance with the Peirce's philosophy and indicates, for issues that require moral correctness, an epistemic realism without representation that arranges itself with a moral constructivism that is not, in turn, a mere contextualism when he claims a pretension of uncondicionality for moral legitimacy under the assumption of an independent world and more or less the same for everyone. To these ends, Habermas maintains, in his formal pragmatics, an "almost" ideal condition to speech, which keeps the tension between empiric and ideal. In addition, in adjusting his ethics, Habermas refutes the Peircean concept of final opinion of inquirers to ensure the fallible propositions taken as true, because he considers this request a priori, directive and transcendental, not applicable to the consensus of those involved in moral phenomena. It has been observed, however, that the solution of integrating all these philosophical questions given by Habermas, specially for the tension of ideality within his pragmatic bias embodies substantial elements from Peirce's philosophy, that allows to assert that in updating his moral philosophy, there is an extension and elaboration of what existed in suggestions and roots in classical pragmatism, which Peirce did not accomplish