Emissão de dívida e gerenciamento de resultados

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to analyze the earnings management (EM) around the issuance of debentures of companies listed in BM&FBOVESPA. EM is a purposeful intervention in the external financial reports in order to get some private gain. This practice is especially important at the time of issue of debentures, this because, if the results are inflated, investors may pay an artificially high price. To measure earnings management, the current discretionary accruals were used as proxy. The applied econometric models were Modified Jones and Modified Jones with ROA. We run all regressions with fixed effects and time dummies. It was found evidence that the companies inflate its financial results in the emission period in order to positively influence their investors. The results suggest that there is EM in the quarter preceding the issue (t = - 1), indicating the influence that investors may have suffered in making the decision to invest in debentures of these companies. In addition, it was verified that companies with higher debt, profitability and sales growth ratios have higher earnings management levels. The reputation of the auditor was not statistically significant compared to the reduction of management level. The results also show that companies listed on Level II and New Market had higher levels of management when considering the model of Modified Jones with ROA. Therefore, we conclude that there is a greater earnings management level of companies that issue debentures in the period preceding the issuance. The variable that is directly related to earnings management level is sales growth